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A FEDERAL CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
(ON THE MOON-THAT IS)
WHITNEY R. HARRIS*=
The report of a visit to the Moon was discovered recently in a
capsule hidden away among the law reviews in the library of a well-
known American law school. Unfortunately, neither the author of the
report nor the institution to which it was addressed has been ascertained.
Research to that end has been instituted and it is hoped that the true
facts concerning this twentieth-century literary find may soon be known.
Meanwhile, authorization has been received to reveal certain portions of
the report:
Upon our arrival in the middle of the Moonjave Desert
we were greeted by a reception committee of Moonmen. They
were friendly and hospitable and altogether quasi-human. They
escorted us to their capital city-Alcatraz-where we were put
up-rather, I should say, put down in a hotel for interplanetary
visitors, called Celestial House. The reason we were put down
is that Alcatraz on the Moon is all underground. These Moon-
men are too wise, in this age of interplanetary guided and
unguided missiles, to live any longer on the surface of the
ground.
We were very much impressed with Moon Society. For
in Alcatraz on the Moon people literally do nothing except
push buttons, ring bells, and pull levers. You see Alcatraz is
a completely technological city. It was finished in every
mechanical detail about the time Alley Oop took his first ride
on Dinny. And since the metal they use is indestructible, there
hasn't been a thing for them to do since then except to reg-
ulate their machines.
But they keep busy-because, after all, they are quasi-
human. And so, of course, they have a government, and every-
one spends 40 hours a week at work governing everyone else,
and that keeps the people occupied and happy and creates a good
deal of confusion and turmoil as well.
We were very much interested in their form of govern-
ment, the pursuit of which had been their sole interest for so
many millions of years, and we were gratified to learn that,
after so much- experience, its basic structure was not unlike
our own.
They have four branches-the legislative headed by the
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Congress, the executive headed by the President, the judicial
headed by the Chief Justice, and a branch they call the admin-
istrative headed by the PAPAPEBAOBOG. Now PAPAPE-
BAOBOG is really an abbreviation. It stands for Principal
Administrator Possessing All Powers Exercised By All Other
Branches Of Government. We learned that 99.7 per cent of
all the employees of Moon Government work in the fourth,
or the administrative branch.
PAPAPEBAOBOG is a rather difficult word for Earth-
men to pronounce and we were relieved to learn that the
Moonmen call it PAPA for short. We asked PAPA to explain
the Why's and Wherefore's of the administrative branch of
Government on the Moon. He pushed a couple of buttons and
rang a bell and then gave us his undivided attention.
Now the Wrhy of this administrative branch of the Moon
Government is most interesting. You would think that in a
completely technical, automatic system, there would be no
need for administrative agencies to perform regulatory func-
tions. After all, in Moon Society, everything is regulated by
the people who push the buttons, etc. But the Moonmen long
ago asked the question-If the regulators regulate society, who
is to regulate the regulators? To answer this need they estab-
lished this fourth--administrative-branch of the government.
The basic legislation guiding PAPA is FAPA-you can
guess what that is-the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
We were disappointed that they hadn't got around to calling it
a code. But perhaps the reason they don't have a code yet is
because they only have one administrative agency on the Moon,
to supervise their button pushers, and don't need anything quite
that comprehensive. Anyway, we examined this basic legislation
and, without going into detail, this is what we learned.
They distinguish between rules and orders. That which is
legislative in form, that is, would be enacted 'by the Congress in
the absence of an administrative system, is called a rule and the
process by which it is adopted is known as a rule-making. That
which is judicial in form, that is, would be conducted by the
judiciary in the absence of an administrative system, is called
an order and the process by which it is promulgated is known
as adjudication.
As to rule-making, they believe that the administrative
process should generally follow the customary methods of
enacting legislation. They have noted that most acts of Con-
gress are adopted after public debate and committee hearings in
which views for and against the bill are presented and consid-
ered. Of course, not everyone is interested in administrative
rules, so they worked out a plan by which, before rules are
adopted by the agency, reasonable notice of the proposal to do
so is published in the Moonbook. This Moonbook might be
described as a short-form Federat Register since instead of pub-
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lishing everything at length in it, they give accurate summations
of what is proposed, together with notice of the time and place
where interested persons can present their views. The agency
is required to consider fully all submissions and, except as to
rules of procedure, to issue, when requested by an interested
person, a concise statement of the matters considered in adopt-
ing or rejecting the rule and the reasons therefor. After one
of these rules is promulgated, it has the force and effect of law.
Of course, it can be challenged in the courts as contrary to the
constitution, or in excess of statutory authority, or enacted
without compliance with procedural requirements, or on other
points of law. But there is no judicial review of facts in rule-
making and the courts on the Moon thus perform substantially
the same function in reviewing agency rules that they do in
reviewing acts of Congress.
The adjudicative functions of the agency are handled
about as the courts would deal with them in the absence of the
agency, taking account, however, of the specialized functions
of the agency and the need for sound judgment in technical
matters. They have a word for this--expertise. When it is
convenient to do so, they entrust certain of these adjudicative
functions to the courts. And where specialization seems par-
ticularly desirable, they establish courts of special jurisdiction.
These administrative courts hear and decide administrative law
cases at the trial level. We found that their Tax Court is a
part of the judiciary rather than an independent tribunal in
the executive branch of the Government. In most cases tried
in the administrative courts the agency initiates and prosecutes
the action and the court receives and considers the evidence
and decides the case just as the ordinary courts decide other
cases in which the government is one of the parties. If the
agency is dissatisfied with the policy result of an administrative
court decision it soon rectifies it, as to future cases, by adopting
a new rule consistent with its delegated powers. So even though
the courts have an important function in adjudicating cases, the
agency, through its powers of investigation, initiating com-
plaints, prosecuting actions, and enacting rules, retains the ulti-
mate control over administrative policy.
Where adjudicative functions are retained within the
agency itself, an ingenious method is used to maintain the
separation of powers which seems to underlie their whole system
of government. They accomplish this by assigning to certain
commissioners within the agency the sole function of deciding
cases. In the performance of adjudicative functions, these
commissioners have considerable independence. They are not
subject to the control or direction of the investigating and
prosecuting personnel of the agency. They may not receive
evidence or hear arguments from any person or party except
upon notice and opportunity for all parties to be present. And
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they are required to base each decision upon the record adduced
before them.
After the hearing is concluded, the commissioners find the
facts, state conclusions of law, and render what is called the
initial decision. This decision becomes final unless reviewed by
the agency on appeal to, or by direction of, the agency. Since
the commissioners have heard all the evidence, have observed
the demeanor of the witnesses, and are specialists in adjudication,
their findings of evidentiary fact are binding upon the agency
unless, of course, they are contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence.
After the agency considers the briefs and hears arguments,
it renders its final decision which may affirm, set aside, or
modify the order of the commissioner. But in the performance
of this decisional function the agency, too, is considered as
engaged in adjudication, is restricted to the record on review,
and may not consult any person or party other than per-
sonal assistants and employees who have not participated in
the same or in currently factually related cases. "In other
words," we said, "your agency is something like the House of
Lords. At one time it acts in a legislative capacity, in other
cases it may act in a judicial capacity; but it keeps these two
functions separated." And PAPA said, "administratively
speaking, that is substantially correct."
Now, at this juncture it should be noted that what we have
been describing is the formal adjudicative process of the admin-
istrative law system on the Moon. They use this process
whenever, either under the constitution or by statute, a hearing
is required in an adjudicative proceeding. There are a great
many adjudicative matters for which hearings are not so pre-
scribed, such as proprietary functions, public contracts, and
determinations based upon inspections, tests, or examinations.
In those cases the decision of the subordinate officer is usually
subject to intra-agency review by a board or superior officer.
No formal record is made of the informal adjudications, and
appeals which are taken to the courts are necessarily based upon
the record adduced de novo in the reviewing court. But the
same limitations apply on scope of review as in formal adjudica-
tion.
Judicial review of formal agency adjudications follows
closely the appellate review of decisions of trial courts. In
effect, the Moonmen consider the final decision of the agency
as the equivalent of the final judgment of a trial court. Deci-
sions may be set aside for error of law, or for abuse of discre-
tion, or for clearly erroneous findings of fact.
Well, that gave us a pretty clear picture of the administra-
tive law system on the Moon, and we asked PAPA how it
works in practice. He obliged by telling us about a case which
had just been decided by their high court.
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It seems that the agency had duly promulgated, after
notice, a rule requiring all dispensers of Moonjuice to be
licensed. One of the agency investigators discovered a Moon-
man by the name of Snuffy Smith who was selling Moonjuice
without a license. An action was brought against Smith to
assess a civil penalty of fifteen lashes and ten days in the stock
for violating this agency rule. The case was heard before an
independent trial commissioner who received the evidence,
found against Smith, and declared the penalty. On appeal, the
agency departed from its usual custom, received additional
evidence, and confirmed the ruling. When the case finally
reached the high court the evidence was almost gone, but there
was enough left to be reviewed and the court retired to consider
its opinion. When the court rendered its judgment it reversed
the agency and ordered judgment for Smith on the ground
that Smith could not have been guilty of selling Moonjuice
without a license since the product he was selling was not
Moonjuice at all, but Moonshine.
While the report goes on to describe other fascinating aspects of
life on the Moon, its usefulness to students of administrative law
terminates with the Snuffy Smith case-in fact, it probably should have
terminated just before the Smith case. If the Moonmen-possessed of
quasi-celestial intelligence--could do no better in the practical applica-
tion of their administrative system than in Snuffy's case--simple and
logical as that system may seem in form-we need not engage in too
much self-censure over the lack of progress we simple Earthlings have
made since someone first recognized that administrative law was assum-
ing a vital role in modern government.
Actually, we have had the administrative process for a very long
time. Sir William Holdsworth wrote that:
If a lawyer, a statesman, or a political philosopher of the 18th
century had been asked what was, in his opinion, the most
distinctive feature of the British constitution, he would have
replied that its most distinctive feature was the separation of
powers of the different organs of the government.
Yet 18th century England had its boards and bureaus administering
the business of government in much the same way that agencies of
government function today.
Somehow, we seemed to awaken to the fact of administrative law
a long time after it came into existence. It has only been in this century
that the administrative process has received extensive, critical examination
and that administrative law has acquired a subject status in our law
schools.
The American Bar Association first took serious note of this area
of the law with the creation in May 1933 of a Special Committee on
Practice of Administrative Law. In 1945, this committee became the
present Section of Administrative Law of the American Bar Association.
1958]
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The committee undertook a study of the administrative process. It
reported that the judicial functions of federal agencies could be separated
from their legislative and executive functions only by creating an admin-
istrative court with appropriate branches and divisions. The 1936 report
of the committee contained an extensive argument in favor of such a
court, and the Association approved that recommendation in principle.
Following the disclosure of inadequacies in publication of adminis-
trative orders in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,' the federal govern-
ment began to take positive interest in the subject. In 1939, President
Roosevelt requested the Attorney General of the United States to
appoint a committee to invcstigate the "need for procedural reform in
the field of administrative law." This committee was duly appointed,
and on January 24, 1941, submitted its report to the President, including
the draft of a proposed bill on federal administrative procedure.
Meanwhile, similar legislation known as the Logan-Walter Bill had
passed both houses of Congress only to be vetoed by the President, pending
the report of the Attorney General's committee.
In 1946, Congress passed and the President signed the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. This legislation was premised on the Logan-
Walter Bill and the majority and minority reports of the Attorney
General's committee. It was the first general statement of legal princi-
ples applicable to the federal administrative agencies.
When the Second Hoover Commission began its study of the
Executive Branch of the Government in 1953, a special Task Force
was created on Legal Services and Procedure. Unlike the Attorney
General's committee, this Task Force was not limited to administrative
procedure but undertook a -broad inquiry into the administration of legal
affairs in the executive branch, including studies of personnel, organi-
zation, representation, jurisdiction, due process, efficiency, and economy.
Administrative procedure was but one of many subjects examined by
the Task Force.
The report of the Task Force contained numerous proposals for
revision of the Administrative Procedure Act and called for enactment
of a Code of Administrative Procedure which was to have been more
comprehensive than the present act. This report, together with draft
legislation, was duly submitted by the Task Force to the Commission, and
upon that report the Commission then formulated its recommendations
for submission to the Congress on April 11, 1955.
The American Bar Association took note of the several recom-
mendations of the Hoover Commission in the area of legal services
and procedure and created a Special Committee of the Association. on
Legal Services and Procedure. All sections and committees of the
Association having a substantial interest in legal services and procedure
of the federal government were represented on this committee.
1293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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Several sub-committees of the Special Committee were appointed
to work on various aspects of the subject. The Section on Administrative
Law was assigned the task of preparing a first draft of a revision of the
Administrative Procedure Act. For this purpose, a special drafting com-
mittee was appointed, which reported to the Council, which reported
to the Section, which reported to the Advisory Committee, which sub-
mitted a final revised draft to the Special Committee. Finally, the
Special Committee submitted its draft to interested professional groups
and organizations and in due course published what is called the April
1957 Final Draft of a Code of Federal Administrative Procedure of
the Special Committee on Legal Services and Procedure of the American
Bar Association.
The description of the administrative law system on the Moon out-
lines in a very general way the principal provisions of the proposed code.
A major objective of the code is to simplify the Administrative Procedure
Act and to make it a more acceptable statement of congressional policy
governing federal administrative procedure. It should be remembered
that most of the independent regulatory bodies have detailed procedure
and practice requirements in the legislation governing their own work.
Reasonable procedural uniformity is a desirable goal, but some differences
in procedure are essential if account is -to be taken of varying agency
and departmental activities and responsibilities. Any general legislation,
such as the Administrative Procedure Act, must be sufficiently flexible
to enable departments and agencies of the federal government to per-
form their functions in an efficient and effective manner. The need
for prompt and decisive action must not be unduly impeded by the
desire for procedural uniformity in the administrative activities of
government.
The proposed code liberalizes the Administrative Procedure Act in
several respects. As to public information, it provides exemptions for
subject matter required to be kept secret in the protection of national
security, submitted in confidence pursuant to statute or agency rule or
direction, the disclosure of which would -be a dearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy, or the publication of which is exempt by statute.
Provision is made for alternative methods of publication where such
alternatives would achieve economy and expedite dissemination of the
information. As to rule making, it provides exemptions from notice and
public participation in rule making required to be kept secret in the
protection of national security, or relating to public property, loans,
grants, benefits, contracts, or the internal management or personnel of
the agency. As to adjudication, it provides informal methods of procedure
for proprietary functions, public contracts, and determinations based
upon inspections, tests, or examinations. Provision is made for the issuance
of temporary and emergency rules without compliance with formal rule
making procedures and for the issuance of emergency orders without
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compliance with formal adjudicative procedures.
The proposed code contains some features which would extend the
applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act. The code would
redefine rule-making to mean statements of general applicability and
future effect implementing, interpreting, or declaring law or policy,
thereby in effect transferring statements of particular applicability, such
as rate orders, to the category of adjudication. The code would establish
the initial decision as the sole method of hearing formal adjudicative
cases by hearing commissioners and would restrict agencies in overturning
such decisions on the evidentiary facts to cases in which such facts were
contrary to the weight of the evidence. Upon judicial review, agency
decisions in matters of adjudication could be set aside under the code
where based upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous on the
whole record. Provision is made for court actions to enjoin agen~y pro-
ceedings clearly in excess of constitutional or statutory authority.
The Committee on Government Operations of the House of
Representatives is now conducting a survey and study of federal adminis-
trativte organizations, procedure, and practice. As a part of this study
the committee prepared a comprehensive questionnaire which it submitted
to the several departments and agencies of the executive branch of the
Government engaged in administrative functions. The responses to this
questionnaire were published in December 1957 for ten departments
and thirty-one independent agencies. Analysis of these responses shows
considerable variations in administrative practice and procedure among
these departments and agencies. This survey by the Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations will enable the Committee and the Congress to
evaluate the various matters proposed for inclusion in the Code of
Administrative Procedure.
Administrative procedure is no more static than judicial procedure.
The methods by which quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions of
government are performed will constantly -be changed and improved in
the light of experience. But the tempo of change will not necessarily
be the same for all departments and agencies. Some will find it possible
and convenient to develop formal procedures to a very high degree;
others may find the adoption of such procedures a serious obstacle to
the performance of tasks of great urgency and importance. A code of
administrative procedure can do no more than establish minimum standards
of administrative practice and procedure. It should provide procedural
guideposts for departments and agencies. But it should not be expected
to replace the more definite and comprehensive standards of practice
and procedure governing each of the several departments and agencies
of the federal government charged with the performance of administra-
tive functions vital to the security and well-being of the American people.
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